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Memory analysis is increasingly used to collect digital evidence in incident response. With
the fast growth in memory analysis, however, anti-forensic techniques appear to prevent it
from performing the bootstrapping steps d operating system (OS) ﬁngerprinting, Direc-
tory Table Base (DTB) identiﬁcation, and obtaining kernel objects. Although most pub-
lished research works try to solve anti forensics, they deal only with one element among
the three steps. Thus, collapse in any of the three steps using the suggested robust algo-
rithms leads to failure in the memory analysis. In this paper, we evaluate the latest
memory forensic tools against anti-forensics. Then, we suggest a novel robust algorithm
that guarantees the bootstrapping analysis steps. It uses only one kernel data structure
called KiInitialPCR, which is a kernel global variable based on the kernel processor control
region (KPCR) structure and has many ﬁelds with tolerance to mutation. We characterize
the robust ﬁelds of the KPCR structure to use them for OS ﬁngerprinting, DTB identiﬁca-
tion, and obtaining kernel objects. Then, we implement the KiInitialPCR-based analysis
system. Therefore, we can analyze the compromised memory in spite of the interference of
anti-forensics.
© 2016 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC
BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Introduction
Memory forensics means the process of acquiring
physical memory, which contains volatile data, and col-
lecting evidence from the acquired memory image. Since
the Digital Forensic Research Conference memory chal-
lenge (Dfrws, 2005) opened in 2005, the extraction of
volatile data such as disk encryption key (Mrdovic and
Huseinovic, 2011) and user input information (Olajide
et al., 2012), as well as the process list (Betz, 2005), has
been researched. Memory forensics has become important
in digital forensics in that it can extract these volatile data,
which is impossible from a hard disk.
Anti-forensic techniques have appeared to prevent
memory analysis, due to its importance. According to thee), hhu@nsr.re.kr (H.
(B. Noh).
vier Ltd. This is an open accdeﬁnition of anti-forensics (Harris, 2006), anti-forensics to
memory analysis is divided into two parts; preventing
memory acquisition andmemory analysis. In these aspects,
research on anti-memory acquisition has progressed
(Stüttgen and Cohen, 2013).
Anti-forensic techniques to prevent memory analysis
modify fragile signatures on a live system to block the path
to evidence (Takahiro Haruyama, 2012). In addition, they
can compromise the kernel data structure ﬁeld, which has a
semantic value, to make the memory analysis tools mislead
the ﬁelds (Prakash et al.). Further, they can construct fake
kernel objects to increase the analysis time (Jake Williams,
2014). Among these anti-forensic techniques, the one-byte
abort factor showed extreme limitations in modern mem-
ory analysis algorithms by modifying only one-byte value
used in memory analysis.
To deal with anti-forensic techniques for memory fo-
rensics, OS-Sommelier (Gu et al., 2012) and OS-
Sommelierþ (Gu et al., 2015) suggest a code-basedess article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/
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ﬁngerprinting on a system that is ensured integrity of the
kernel code. Additionally, image-based signature (Roussev
et al., 2014) is valuable for OS ﬁngerprinting with a
corpus of known kernel binaries. Furthermore, proﬁle
indexing (Cohen, 2015) identiﬁes kernel versions using
only the globally unique identiﬁer (GUID) without known
kernel binaries. However, the advance preparation of this
method before comparing the proﬁle indexes is long and is
weak against interference. The Directory Table Base (DTB)
identiﬁcation of OS-Sommelier is excellent for the 86
system but is complicated. Research about robust signa-
tures for kernel data structures (Dolan-Gavitt et al., 2009;
Lin et al.; Lin) needs to know the OS versions for accurate
scanning. In the viewpoint of comprehensive analysis,
these research works against anti-forensics handle only
one element among the bootstrapping steps for memory
analysis d OS ﬁngerprinting, DTB identiﬁcation, and
obtaining kernel objects, which means that any collapse in
the robust algorithms will lead to failure in the memory
analysis.
Therefore, in this paper, we show the anti-forensic tech-
niques and the limitations of modern analysis algorithms.
Then, we suggest a novel memory analysis algorithm based
on KiInitialPCR, which assures the bootstrapping analysis. It
locates theKPCR structure,whichhasmany robustﬁelds, and
uses the relationship among ﬁelds that point to global vari-
ables for OS ﬁngerprinting. It also acquires DTB in the KPCR
structure. In addition, it calculates the relative offset based on
KiInitialPCR (instead of the kernel base) to list the kernel
objects. Thus, we prove that it is an effective and compre-
hensive analysis algorithm that uses only one robust struc-
ture against anti-forensic techniques.
Section 2 explains how anti-forensics disturb memory
analysis, and shows limitation of bootstrapping analysis
used by existing tools. It also shows the limitations of
current research against anti-forensic techniques. Section 3
evaluates the modern memory analysis methods, including
the bootstrapping analysis against anti-forensics. Section 4
introduces the KiInitialPCR-based analysis to deal with
anti-forensic techniques. This analysis carves the KiIni-
tialPCR, identiﬁes the OS version, and extracts the process
list and the module list using non-modiﬁable ﬁelds in the
memory. Section 5 shows the implementation of the sug-
gested analysis procedure. Section 6 discusses the limita-
tions of our system. The ﬁnal section offers conclusions and
directions for future research.
Background
Anti-forensics
Anti-forensics concentrates on how to make in-
vestigators fail to collect volatile evidence by modifying
critical values used in memory analysis. An attacker with
high privilege can modify kernel memory.
The one-byte abort factor attack (Takahiro Haruyama,
2012) shows that important signatures are easily over-
written by malware in such a way that memory analysis
can fail to ﬁnd it. In addition, semantic value manipulation
(SVM) attack mutates semantic values, which are datavalues with important semantic meanings (Prakash et al.).
Further, the attention-deﬁcit-disorder (ADD) technique
creates fake objects to lead investigators down a wrong
path and increases the analysis time (Jake Williams, 2014).
Whereas the SVMandADDcananalyzephysicalmemory
images and extract volatile data irrespective if the data are
genuine, modiﬁed, or fake, attacking bootstrapping analysis
like the abort factor makes the analysis fail, which means
that the investigator cannot collect any evidence from the
physical memory image. Therefore, the attacking boot-
strapping analysis is an important problem tobe solvedﬁrst.
Physical memory analysis must perform bootstrapping
analysis, which is composed of OS ﬁngerprinting meaning
identifying the OS version, acquiring DTB, and obtaining
the kernel data structures. Correct OS ﬁngerprinting en-
ables precise parsing of the kernel data structures with
accurate structure layout. It also enables precise selection
of the analysis algorithms, which are different in different
versions. Acquisition of DTB enables reconstruction of the
virtual address space, which is the mapping between the
virtual and physical addresses. Obtaining the kernel data
structures enables us to collect kernel data such as process
and thread information.
A potential target of the attacking bootstrapping anal-
ysis is all modiﬁable memory, which does not cause
noticeable differences such as crashes in system state with
modiﬁcation, used in the analysis.
Volatility (The Volatility Foundation, 2015), which is a
famous memory forensic tool, uses KDDEBUGGER_DATA64
structure, which is known as KDBG, to identify the OS
version with Size ﬁeld and get the global kernel variables
with ﬁelds named same as each variables like PsActive-
ProcessHead. Then, it uses the EPROCESS structure of the
idle process to obtain the DTB with DirectoryTableBase.
Memoryze uses the EPROCESS structure of the system
process to identify the OS version by matching DIS-
PATCHER_HEADER signatures of all OS (e.g., y03 y00
y1By00 andy30y00y26y00) and by con-
ﬁrmingwhether the ImageFileName ﬁeld is a “System” string
ornot. Inaddition, itobtains theDTB fromthesystemprocess.
As mentioned in the abort factor, these well-known
analysis algorithms use fragile signatures. The attacker
can modify the “KDBG” string, “Idle” string or “System”
string, which is critical memory values to the analysis, to
abnormal value. As we show in Section 3, this technique
still can disrupt memory analysis.
Rekall (The Rekall Team, 2015a) gathers the program
database (PDB) information from GUID in the RSDS region
of the kernel executables and identiﬁes the OS version from
the PDB information, which contains the structure layout
information and global debugging symbols. It carves the
RSDS region with “RSDS” signature and known PDB ﬁle
names of the kernel executables (e.g., ntoskrnl.pdb).
However, the region of the GUID and PDB ﬁlename is a
modiﬁable memory.
Further, rekall uses the proﬁle indexing method (Cohen,
2015) known as nt index to deal with the abort factor. In
proﬁle generation phase, rekall chooses arbitrarily 10e12
addresses among the virtual addresses of NOP (090) in-
structions preceding the function and of the string literals
(e.g. “FILE_VERSION”). These addresses contain debugging
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composed of the selected addresses and values contained
in the address in each kernel version. In analysis phase,
rekall obtains the DTB in the lead off. Then, it determines
the exact kernel build version by comparing the values of
the addresses in the proﬁles with the indexed values in the
proﬁles. This comparison is called the proﬁle-indexing
method, and the compared virtual addresses are called
“comparison points”.
The proﬁle indexing method suffers from some limita-
tions. The comparison points are also modiﬁable despite of
choosable one randomly. If one of them is modiﬁed, the
analysis can fail or mislead kernel version. Moreover, it
should reconstruct virtual address space for comparison
and ﬁnd kernel base with pe signatures (e.g. “This program
cannot be run in DOSmode”). These pe signatures are easily
modiﬁable without causing any system crashes.Fig. 1. KPCR structure layout in 32-bit system.Limitations against anti-forensics
OS ﬁngerprinting
OS-Sommelier (Gu et al., 2012) generates signatures by
hashing each redeﬁned kernel page without pointer values.
In addition, OS-Sommelierþ (Gu et al., 2015) removes the
kernel module code in the kernel memory and leaves only
the core kernel code on the kernel pages. Then, it hashes
each kernel page to create signatures. This code-hashing-
based approach might be prevented by anti-forensics
owing to their complicated processes. Further, because it is
proposed for virtual machine introspection in cloud system,
it should ensure integrity of the kernel code. However, we
cannot always assure the integrity of the kernel code in real
world, especially in a live response situation.
The image-based identiﬁcation of a kernel version
(Roussev et al., 2014) generates signatures by hashing each
page of the kernel executable binaryandmatching the kernel
in a memory image with a corpus of known binaries by
checking for similarity. However, we do not always have the
actual binaries.
DTB identiﬁcation
The DTB identiﬁcation method suggested in the OS-
Sommelier to reconstruct the virtual address space collects
the DTBs such that at least one entrymust exist that points to
a valid target page directory table. Then, to select a valid DTB,
it compares the similarities of the shared kernel memories
among the collected DTBs. Because this criterion is based on
the ratio of the number of kernel pages, it might identify
invalidDTBs or fail to identify theDTBs if the ratio is changed.
Getting kernel structures
Robust signature research (Dolan-Gavitt et al., 2009)
generates robust signatures for carving kernel data struc-
tures using non-modiﬁable ﬁelds, which crashes the sys-
temwhen they aremodiﬁed. Siggraph (Lin et al.) andMACE
(Lin) rely on point-to-relation or pointer constraints.
Although these robust signature schemes are effective in
carving kernel data structures, they should check the data
structure signatures for various OS versions if it does not
know the accurate structure layout without OSﬁngerprinting. In particular, the use of the point-to-relation
relies on the precise identiﬁcation of the DTB.Memory analysis based on KPCR
The Windows kernel manages the processor informa-
tion using the KPCR structure as shown in Fig. 1. The Kernel
Processor Region Control Block (KPRCB), which is a sub-
structure of the KPCR, contains the DTB in the Cr3 ﬁeld for
virtual address translation.
The KPCR carving condition that is proposed to analyze
the Windows XP memory (Zhang et al., 2009) cannot
analyze Windows 7 because of the non-ﬁxed virtual ad-
dresses of the KPCR and KPRCB. To solve this problem, the
carving method using the ﬁxed difference between the Self
and CurrentPrcb ﬁelds in a 32-bit system is proposed
(Shuhui et al., 2010). It is also applied to the 64-bit system
in accordance with the difference between the SelfPcr and
Prcb ﬁelds.
The KPCR-based analysis implemented for Windows 7
obtains instances of the EPROCESS structure from the
CurrentThread ﬁeld in the KPRCB structure and traverses a
double-linked list to extract the process list. However,
because obtaining invalid EPROCESS structures from the
CurrentThread ﬁeld could occur, the method of extracting
the process list using the PsActiveProcessHead ﬁeld which is
the head entry of the process list in the KDBG structure is
proposed (Thomas et al., 2013).
Assessments of anti-forensics
We developed a proof-of-concept driver that imple-
ments the anti-forensic techniques, and evaluated the
modern tools and methods against this anti-forensic tool.
Modiﬁcation targets of the driver are described as follows:
 System EPROCESS: used to identify the OS version and
to obtain the DTB
 Idle EPROCESS: used to obtain the DTB
 KDBG structure: used to identify the OS version
 RSDS region: used to identify the kernel build version,
including the OS version
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ﬁngerprinting.
 Comparison points: used to identify the kernel build
version, including the OS version.
We have modiﬁed the DISPATCHER_HEADER and the
ImageFileName ﬁelds of the System and Idle processes and
the OwnerTag and the Size ﬁelds of the KDBG structure
according to how they are presented in the one-byte abort
factor (Takahiro Haruyama, 2012). To evaluate the new
analysis method, we also modiﬁed the RSDS region of the
kernel executable, pe signatures of the kernel base, and the
comparison points. These ﬁelds were modiﬁed to arbitrary
values. All tested memory modiﬁcations do not cause any
system crashes.
The evaluation system used is theWindows 7 SP164-bit
with a fully updated inside VMware Workstation. We have
tested a tool that implements KPCR-based analysis
(Thomas et al., 2013) as well as the latest version of the
volatility, rekall, and memoryze.
For the evaluation, we selected the extraction process
list function as a common function that includes the steps
of identifying the OS versions and obtaining the DTBs
among the functions of the target tools.
The results show that all tested analysis tools result in
analysis-fail state by at least one of the tested anti-forensic
techniques, as listed in Table 1. It shows that not only do the
analysis methods of the modern tools still haveweaknesses
to anti-forensics but also that an analysis method to deal
with anti-forensics is easily disabled by modifying the
other memories that are essential in the algorithm.
Even though the comparison points of the proﬁle
indexing are arbitrarily changeable, the proﬁle indexing
can possibly be defeated by anti-forensics, because it still
uses a modiﬁable memory. In addition, it causes failure in
ﬁnding kernel base if the pe signatures are modiﬁed.
The KPCR-based analysis method (Thomas et al., 2013)
obtains only the DTB from the KPCR. When trying to extract
the process list, it carves the KDBG and uses the PsActive-
ProcessHead ﬁeld of the KDBG,which is amodiﬁablememory.
Memory analysis based on KiInitialPCR
Challenges
The modern memory analysis tools, as presented in
Section 3, are still prone to be subverted by the attacking
bootstrapping analysis. In addition, most state-of-the-art
research against anti-forensics, as presented in Section 3,
suffer from some limitations such as the need to ensure theTable 1
Results of the analysis with anti-forensics. TheB symbol indicates that the tool s
the  symbol indicates that the tool fails to analyze the image.
Memory modiﬁcation target Volatility 2.5 Memoryze 3.0
Idle process  B
System process B 
KDBG  B
RSDS B B
PE signatures B B
Comparison points B Bintegrity of the kernel code, collect known binaries, and run
complicated algorithms. This means that any collapse in the
three steps using the suggested robust algorithms leads to
failure in the memory analysis. Therefore, we should
ensure the bootstrapping analysis. Also, if possible, we
should use only robust memory data, which causes
noticeable differences in system state like BSOD or stopped
state with modiﬁcation, as mentioned in robust signature
research (Dolan-Gavitt et al., 2009).
We need to ﬁnd a satisfactory structure according to the
following conditions.
 It should have the same structure layout across various
versions, and we can apply the same carving rule to
locate it.
 It should have robust ﬁelds that can be used for OS
ﬁngerprinting.
 It should have robust ﬁelds that include a DTB value.
 It should be a kernel global variable.
The reason for the kernel global variable in the condi-
tions is for us to access other important kernel global var-
iables by adding the relative offsets of that variable.
We could ﬁnd a structure that satisﬁes the above con-
ditions, which is called the KPCR structure. One of the KPCR
structures is the kernel global variable named KiInitialPCR.
Because the KPCR structure is a key data for managing and
controlling the processor, the KiInitialPCR-based analysis
method will be effective as long asWindows changes its OS
architecture. Thus, we propose a novel robust algorithm
that guarantees the bootstrapping analysis through
KiInitialPCR.Feature of KiInitialPCR
The number of KPCR structures is equal to the number of
processors in the system because Windows kernel pro-
duces KPCR structures that manage each processor. The
kernel beyond Windows 7 manages the ﬁrst-generated
KPCR structures as a kernel global variable KiInitialPCR.
On the other hand, other KPCR structures are allocated in
the dynamic memory area in the kernel.
We carve the KiInitialPCR, identify the OS version, and
extract the process list from the KiInitialPCR. The reasons
for the use of the KiInitialPCR are as follows:
First, the KPCR structure has almost the same ﬁelds in
theWindows OSs and identical sizewith the system bit. We
can approach the KPCR structures even if we do not know
the OS version.uccessfully extracts the process list from the physical memory image, and
Rekall 1.4.1 (RSDS) Rekall 1.4.1 (nt index) KPCR
 B B
B B B
B B 
 B B
B  B
B  B
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many non-modiﬁable ﬁelds. Such ﬁelds are difﬁcult for an
attacker tomodify without crashes and are good candidates
for robust signatures.
In addition, the KiInitialPCR has a self-reference ﬁeld,
whichmeans that it has a virtual address to itself, named as
SelfPcr in the 32-bit system and Self in the 64-bit system.
This self-reference ﬁeld enables us to directly access other
kernel global variables without ﬁnding the kernel base
address if the distance is known in advance.
In this section, we generate the carving conditions with
the KPCR ﬁelds where anti-forensics cannot be applied.
This feature has not been dealt with in previous research
called KPCR-based analysis method. Further, we carve the
KiInitialPCR. Then we introduce the methods of OS ﬁnger-
printing and obtaining the kernel global variable PsActi-
veProcessHead from the KiInitialPCR.Carving of KiInitialPCR
Generation of carving signature
The KPCR structure stores the processor information,
and the kernel executes the code using the stored processor
information. The system crashes when some processor
information is changed to invalid values.
We generate robust carving signatures on the KPCR
structure using the VMware Workstation because the KiI-
nitialPCR has the same structure type as the other KPCRs.
The robust signature research (Dolan-Gavitt et al., 2009)
could allocate a new object to generate a carving signature.
However, we cannot allocate an instance of a KPCR struc-
ture because it is only allocated at boot time under normal
circumstances. Therefore, we simply reboot the system
after each test is ﬁnished and let the system allocate new
instances of KPCR structures.
We implement the KPCR carving tool using the KPCR
carving method (Thomas et al., 2013) to locate the KPCR
structure instance in the virtual memory ﬁle. It uses the
condition where the difference between the SelfPcr and
Prcb ﬁelds is 0120 in the 32-bit system and that between
the Self and CurrentPrcb ﬁelds is 0180 in the 64-bit system.
It also checks whether the physical address translated from
the Self ﬁeld is equal to the physical address of KPCR.
The environments that generate the signature are
Windows 7 SP1, 8, 8.1, and 10 32/64-bit version that are
fully updated and running on a virtual machine. Also it has
the quad-core CPU to conﬁrm whether the system crashes
or not in case the KPCR structures are modiﬁed in the
multiprocessor environment.
The ﬁelds used in generating the signature are used
with the ﬁelds preceding the CurrentPrcb ﬁeld in the 32-bit
system and the Prcb ﬁeld in the 64-bit system and with the
same name, offset, and type size in the tested systems.
The robust ﬁelds among the chosen ﬁelds are the SelfPcr,
Prcb, and GDT in the 32-bit version and the Self, CurrentPrcb,
GdtBase, and LockArray in the 64-bit version. These ﬁelds in
the 64-bit version perform the same role as 32-bit ﬁelds in
sequence. In this paper, we call the ﬁeld names as the ﬁelds
of the 64-bit version, which has same meaning as each
respective ﬁeld in the 32-bit version.Using the relationship between ﬁelds that causes the
system crash during modiﬁcation, as listed in Table 2, we
generate the robust KPCR carving signatures that are non-
modiﬁable. These signatures include the condition that
uses the relationship between the Self and CurrentPrcb
ﬁelds in the previous KPCR carving research. In the 64-bit
system, the LockArray ﬁeld has a ﬁxed offset from the
CurrentPrcb ﬁeld to the LockQueue ﬁeld of the KPRCB
because it points to the LockQueue ﬁeld.
A selection of KiInitialPCR
We should select the KiInitialPCR among the carved
KPCRs because the carving condition locates not only the
KiInitialPCR but also the other KPCR structures. Themethod
of selecting the KiInitialPCR is to check whether the value
of the Number ﬁeld, which is always zero in a normal KiI-
nitialPCR, is zero or not. The offset of the Number ﬁeld is
equal to 03 cc in the 32-bit system and 024 in the 64-bit
system in all OSs. Similar to the previous KPCR-based
analysis (Thomas et al., 2013), we check the validation of
the KiInitialPCR by comparing the translated value of the
Self ﬁeld that self-referenced the carved offset.
Modiﬁcation possibilities in carving
The KPCR carving signature is generated by the non-
modiﬁable ﬁelds. In addition, the Number ﬁeld, which is
used to select the KiInitialPCR from the others, causes the
system to crash in case it is modiﬁed. The Cr3 ﬁeld used to
obtain the DTB is continuously renewed without a system
error because the system only stores the CR3 register and
does not use the register value stored in it. Therefore, it is
not affected by the modiﬁcation.Memory analysis using KiInitialPCR
Identiﬁcation of OS version
The IdleThread ﬁeld of the KPRCB, which is a substruc-
ture of the KiInitialPCR, points to the kernel global variable
KiInitialThread. On the other hand, this ﬁeld in the other
KPCR points to the ETHREAD structure which is allocated in
the heap memory. As kernel global variables, KiInitialPCR
and KiInitialThread are located at ﬁxed locations from the
kernel base in the same kernel build version, and the dis-
tance between these ﬁelds is ﬁxed.
In a previous research (Cohen, 2015), the relative offsets,
which are the distances from the kernel base, of the global
kernel variables greatly vary with the kernel build version
even in the same OS version. To check whether the distance
between KiInitialThread and KiInitialPCR greatly varies or
not, we gather the offsets of the kernel global variables
from each PDB ﬁle corresponding to the kernel version.
The Windows system puts all updated ﬁles, including
the kernel executables, in the WinSxS folder. The kernel
executable contains a unique GUID that refers to the PDB
ﬁle. Therefore, we installed Windows 7 SP1, Windows 8,
Windows 8.1, andWindows 10 32/64 bit inside the VMware
Workstation and updated each system from the initial state
to a fully updated state. Subsequently, after gathering the
kernel executables in theWinSxS folder in each system, we
collected 139 PDB ﬁles from the public Microsoft symbol
Table 2
KPCR CARVING CONDITIONS generated by non-modiﬁable ﬁelds. && indicates the Boolean operator “AND”. % indicates Mod operation. & indicates the
bitwise operator “AND”. The 32-bit KPCR has no ﬁeld corresponding to the LockArray ﬁeld of the 64 bit. Unionmeans a common condition of the robust ﬁelds.
Field(32bit/64bit) 32bit 64bit
Prcb/CurrentPrcb val ¼¼ SelfPcr þ 0120 && val % 020 ¼¼ 0 val ¼¼ CurrentPrcb þ 0180 && val % 020 ¼¼ 0
SelfPcr/Self val ¼¼ Prcb  0120 && val % 0100 ¼¼ 0 val ¼¼ Self  0180 && val % 0100 ¼¼ 0
GDT/GdtBase val % 01000 ¼¼ 0 val % 01000 ¼¼ 0
e/LockArray e val ¼¼ CurrentPrcb þ 0670
Union val !¼ 0 && val > ¼ 080000000 val !¼ 0 && val > ¼ 0FFFF000000000000
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interface, 2015).
The rekall provides public proﬁles repository that has
the GUIDs of PDB ﬁles (The Rekall Team, 2015b). But these
proﬁles don't contain any major version or kernel version
information. This means, although we collect some kernel
global variable's offsets using GUID in these proﬁles, we
cannot know an exact version corresponding with the
GUID. Thus, we collected PDB ﬁles only in a virtual envi-
ronment. As mentioned in (Cohen, 2015), there are many
more versions of the kernel in the real world than our
collection. We show continual patterns of global variable
offsets to assume that the other kernel version has a similar
pattern with these patterns.
Fig. 2 shows the distances that we collected from the
KiInitialPCR to the KiInitialThread. The offsets are constant
or contain little changes in the viewpoint of each OS
version. In the Windows 7 SP1 version, for example, theFig. 2. Offsets between the KiInitialPCR and KiInitialThread in various kernel versio
and 10 only run on processors that support PAE, no non-PAE(I386) offset is presenoffset has a constant value of 38,784 in the 32-bit non-PAE,
38720 in the 32-bit PAE, and 57,280 in the 64 bit. It means
that any global variable between KiInitialPCR and KiIni-
tialThread across various versions in the same major
version is not added or not removed. Furthermore, the
distances between these two variables do not overlap on
each OS version.
Therefore, we identify the OS version using the differ-
ence in the Self and IdleThread ﬁelds of the KiInitialPCR. We
use only a few differences to identify the OS version
because we know paging mechanism (PAE, non-PAE) and
machine bit in the previous steps. We call these differences
as version signatures.
Extraction of process list
Extraction of the process list is a main and common
function among modern memory forensic tools because
the EPROCESS's instance contains and points to a number ofns. These offsets were collected from the PDB ﬁles. Because Windows 8, 8.1,
t.
Fig. 3. Offsets between the KiInitialPCR and PsActiveProcessHead in various kernel versions. These offsets were collected from the PDB ﬁles. Because Windows 8,
8.1, and 10 only run on processors that support PAE, no non-PAE (I386) offset is present.
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information. Therefore, we show how to extract active
process list from the KiInitialPCR.
We collected the distances from the KiInitialPCR to the
PsActiveProcessHead from the collected PDB ﬁles, as shown
in Fig. 3. In the differences, the PsActiveProcessHead offsets
vary more than the KiInitialThread, especially in the 64-bit
system than in the 32-bit system. However, from the
viewpoint of the OS version, an offset tends to repeat older
offsets. For example, four offsets (214,608, 214,640,
214,736, and 215,184) are sequentially repeated on the 64-
bit Windows 7 SP1.
Unfortunately, no direct method is available to deter-
mine a valid PsActiveProcessHead without an exact kernel
build version. Therefore, we need to validate these offsets.
To reduce the number of offsets to validate, we made ﬁnite
sets of the offsets based on each version signature. The
cardinalities of the sets are fewer than eight, which may
add newmembers with the kernel update.We only use one
set among them in the analysis because we know the
version signature.
We need to validate each candidate of the ﬁnite set. We
check whether the list entry completely traverses or not
and validate each EPROCESS structure of the traversable
links. The EPROCESS structure validity check uses robustsignatures for EPROCESS (Dolan-Gavitt et al., 2009) for each
link. After these two validations are successfully ﬁnished,
we obtain the valid PsActiveProcessHead and extract the
process list. Then, we can extract the threads, handles,
loaded modules, and other volatile data that exist in the
process memory from the extracted active processes. Also,
we can ﬁnd a hidden process by comparing the listed
processes with the carved processes.
We also obtain the kernel modules by listing entries of
the PsLoadedModuleList. We obtain the offsets between
PsLoadedModuleList and KiInitialPCR. Similar to the PsAc-
tiveProcessHead offsets, we develop ﬁnite sets of the off-
sets based on each PsActiveProcessHead, instead of the
version signature. The cardinalities of the sets are fewer
than three. In our experiment, we know that the InLoa-
dOrderLinks ﬁeld of the LDR_DATA_TABLE_ENTRY, which is
the structure of the kernel module, is the robust ﬁeld. After
we check whether the list entry completely traverses or
not, we obtain the valid PsLoadedModuleList and extract
the module list.
Modiﬁcation possibilities during the analysis process
This section is composed of two parts: identifying the
OS version and validating the offset of the PsActivePro-
cessHead and PsLoadedModuleList from KiInitialPCR.
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ﬁnd that it immediately causes system crash. In addition,
the genuine PsActiveProcessHead causes system crash
when it is modiﬁed. Some attackers may make a spurious
list composed of fake objects in the offsets of the set, such
as the ADD attack. However, the memory region of the
offsets is still used in the kernel, which means that the
attacker cannot easily manipulate the memory at the off-
sets for the concerned system crash. In addition, even if the
attacker succeeds in manipulating the memory of the off-
sets, we can check only our offsets up to a maximum of
eight, not entire memory. Also the validation of each entry
cannot be subverted because we check the robust carving
condition of the EPROCESS structure ﬁelds for each link
including the head.Fig. 5. Flowchart interpreting the steps for extracting the process list.System implementation
An analysis system based on KiInitialPCR, as shown in
Fig. 4, is divided into the database management of offsets
and memory analysis using the offsets. A Database man-
agement is implemented with cpp language. Also, memory
analysis is implemented with python to use the volatility
framework.
Whenever the Windows kernel version in the virtual
machine is updated, the database management acquires a
PDB information and stores the KiInitialThread and PsAc-
tiveProcessHead offsets from the KiInitialPCR into the
global variable offset database.
The memory analysis obtains the latest offset informa-
tion, which requests it from the database, identiﬁes the OS
version, and extracts the process list.
The memory analysis procedure shown in Fig. 5 consists
of the procedures of carving the KiInitialPCR, identifying
the major OS version, and ﬁnding the PsActiveProcessHead
needed to extract the process list. We modiﬁed partial OS
ﬁngerprinting code of volatility.
The memory analysis obtains latest offset information
which requests it to the database, and identiﬁes the oper-
ating system version and extracts the process list.
Our system carves the KiInitialPCR by checking every
0100 bytes, which is memory alignment of the KPCR
structure. After the carving, the system determines ma-
chine bits due to the difference between the 32- and 64-bit
carving conditions. Because non-PAE and PAE, which are
virtual address translation mechanisms, are used in the 32-Fig. 4. System implementation. The global variable offset dbit system, the system checks both mechanisms, when
validating the carved KiInitialPCR by Cr3 ﬁeld.
Before the OS ﬁngerprinting, the system learns the
machine bit and the virtual address translationmechanism.
Therefore, we can exactly identify the OS version by
comparing the identiﬁcation key belonging to this known
information.
The system uses the DTB value stored in the Cr3 ﬁeld of
the KiInitialPCR for translating each link entry starting from
the PsActiveProcessHead to the physical offset of the
memory image. Then, it extracts the process list.atabase is updated when new updates are released.
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then we measure performance of our system. In case of
Windows 7 images, average analysis time is 2 s, due to
KiInitialPcr is located at low physical address. Also, images
ofWindows 8.1 andWindows 10 take 4min for 8 GB, due to
the KiInitialPCR is located at the end of ﬁle. In contrast, the
kpcr plugin of volatility takes longer than over 1 h to the
same memory images, because it checks only address
equality between SelfPcr and the physical offset on every
byte. Our higher speed comes from value-based signatures
and checking 0100 byte unit.
Discussion
In this paper, we have proven that we can analyze the
memory using only one robust structure. However, our
system suffers from some limitations as outlined in the
following.Lack of information
Our system requires known GUIDs and OS versions
corresponding to each GUID to analyze the physical
memory. Therefore, the main problem of our system is the
lack of information on the GUIDs and OS versions. If we
only know the GUIDwithout the OS version, we can use the
PDB ﬁle provided by the Microsoft public server. Although
the PDB ﬁle does not contain the version information, we
can approximately learn the version based on the existing
symbols and ﬁeld names or the ﬁeld offset of a certain
structure that exists in the proﬁle.͡Relocating kernel objects
Our system identiﬁes the OS versions using Self ﬁeld and
IdleThread ﬁeld of the KPCR structure. The attacker would
adjust the gap of the ﬁelds to abort OS ﬁngerprinting by
relocating the KiInitialPCR and KiInitialThread to other
allocated memory. We implemented it as simple driver and
tested it.
First, we copied the KiInitialPCR and make the Self ﬁeld
point the copied one. Since the processor state is different
before and after the copy, the system has stopped at once.
Second, we copied the KiInitialThread and make the
IdleThread ﬁeld point the copied one. It generates the sys-
tem crashes after a few minutes on Windows 8, 8.1 and 10.
On the other hand, the system looks like normal on Win-
dows 7.
All PDB ﬁles we have gathered indicate that the
remainder after division of the KiInitialPCR offset by
01000 is 0d00 or 0c00 on Windows 7 and 01000 on
Windows 8, 8.1 and 10 (e.g. 082f3ed00 onWindows 7 and
08182b000 onWindows 10). Therefore, if the result of Self
ﬁeld mod 01000 is non-zero, we can consider a version of
memory image as Windows 7 without IdleThread ﬁeld. If
not, we checkout difference between Self ﬁeld and IdleTh-
read ﬁeld of the KPCR structure which is an instance of
KiInitialPCR. Thus, the attacker cannot easily defeat our
system by relocating important ﬁelds of the system.Other anti-forensic techniques
An attacker can make spurious KiInitialPCRs to increase
the analysis time. In this case, because our automated
system can gather all the KiInitialPCRs that satisfy the
condition on the entire memory image, the analyst has no
option but to rely on his common sense to classify whether
they are genuine or fake. However, our system cannot deal
with SVM attacks.
Collecting other data structures
Because of the characteristics of the robust signature
research, we can only validate certain structures accessed
and read by the kernel or those with sufﬁcient pointer
ﬁelds to achieve pointer relationship signatures.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a KiInitialPCR-based
physical memory analysis methodology using non-
modiﬁable ﬁelds. Whereas most published research
works against anti-forensics handle only one among the OS
ﬁngerprinting, DTB identiﬁcation, and obtaining the kernel
object steps, we analyze one structure that has a number of
robust ﬁelds to identify the OS version and acquire the DTB.
The contributions of our work in this ﬁeld are
summarized:
 We guarantee the bootstrapping analysis, and they are
not subverted by anti-forensic techniques.
 Our OS ﬁngerprinting and DTB identiﬁcation parts allow
effective application of the robust carving signatures
relying on correct operating system information.
 Our robust kernel object listing can ﬁnd hidden objects
by comparing them with carved objects.
In the future, we hope to identify exact kernel versions
using only the robust ﬁelds. Further, we will deal with the
SVM attack and the ADD technique.
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